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ABSTRACT
This paperformulates a.modclof retiremEnt behavior based orthe
o].ution to a stochastic dynamicprogramming problem. The workers
objective istomaximi:e expected thscounted utiHty over hisremaining
lifetime. Ateach time periodthe worker chooses how much to consume and
whether to workfull—time,part—time, or exit the labor force. The model
accounts for the sequential nature f the retirement decision problem,
and the role of expectati one ofuncertain future van abi essuch as the
worker's 4utuelifespan,health status, marital and family status,
employment status, aswellas earnins from employment,assets, end
socialsecurity retirement, disability and medicare payments.This paper
applies a.neeted fixed point" algorithm tha.t converts the dynamic
programming problem intotheproblem ofrepeatedlyrecomputing thefixed
pointto acontracti on mappin operatoras a subroutine ofa standard
nonii near me i mum likelihood pr oQrarr. The goal of the paper- is to
demonstrate that a fairly complex and realistic formulation cf the
retirementproblem cart be estimated usingthisalgorithm and a current
generati on supercomputer, the Cray—2.
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Madison, WI 537061. Introduction
This paper derives a model of the retirement behavior of older male workers
from the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem. The worker's
objective is to maximize expected discounted utility over his remaining
lifetime. At each time period t the worker chooses control variables (c,d)
where c denotes the level of consumption expenditures and dt denotes the
decision whether to work full-time, part-time, or exit the labor force. The
model accounts for the sequential nature of the retirement decision problem and
the role of expectations of the uncertain future values of state variables x
such as the worker's future lifespan, health status, marital and family status,
employment status, and earnings from employment, assets, social security
retirement, disability, and medicare payments. Given specific assumptions about
workers' preferences and expectations, the model generatesapredicted
stochastic process for the variables (ct,d,xt). This paper, however, focuses on
the inverse or "revealed preference" problem: given data on {c,dt,x how can
one go backward and "uncover" the worker's underlying preferencesand
expectations?
One can formalize the revealed preference problem as a problem of
statistical inference. The null hypothesis is that the data ct,d,xt} are
realizations of a controlled stochastic process generated from the solution to a
stochastic dynamic programming problem with utility function u and a stochastic
law of motion iithatdepend on a vector of unknown parameters 0. The underlying
preferences u and expectations itare"uncovered" by finding the parameter vector
o that maximizes the likelihood function for the sample of data. Standard
likelihood ratio, Lagrange multiplier and chi-square goodness of fit statistics
allow one to test whether or not workers are rational in the sense of acting "as
1if" they were solving the specified dynamic programming problem. If the data
appears to be consistent with the dynamic programming model, the estimated model
can be used to forecast the effect of policy changes such as reductions in
social security retirement or disability benefits. Policy forecasts require a
"structural" approach that attempts to uncover the underlying preferences u
rather than the traditional "reduced-form" approach which can be viewed as
uncovering the historical stochastic process for 1ct,d,x1. The problem with
reduced-form methods, noted by Marschak (1957) and later by Lucas (1976), is
that policy changes cause workers to reoptimize, yielding a new controlled
stochasticprocess for that is generally different from the
historical process of the previous policy regime. The structural approach allows
one to solve the dynamic programming problem under the new policy regime and
derive a predicted stochastic process for Recovering the underlying
utility function is also useful for quantifying the extent to which workers are
hurt by various policy changes.
Unfortunately, stochastic dynamic programming problems generally have no
tractable analytic solutions and are typically only described recursively via
Bellman's "principle of optimality". Without such a solution it appears
impossible to write down a simple, analytic likelihood function for the data.
This problem may have deterred previous researchers from estimating "structural"
models of retirement behavior that capture both uncertainty and the sequential
nature of the decision process.' Recently, the advent of new estimation
algorithms and powerful supercomputers has begun to make estimation of more
realistic stochastic dynamic programming models feasible, even though such
models have no analytic solution. The basic idea is very simple: the dynamic
programming problem and associated likelihood function can benumerically
2computed in a subroutine of a standard nonlinear maximum likelihood algorithm.
Rust (1986) developed a "nested fixed point" (NFXP) algorithm that computes
maximum likelihood estimates of structural parameters of discrete control
processes, a class of markovian decision processes for which the control is
restricted to a finite set of alternatives. As its name implies, the NFXP
algorithm works by converting the dynamic programming problem into the problem
of computing a fixed point to a certain contr8ct ion mepping. A measure of the
inherent difficulty or comput8tional complexity of the dynamic programming
problem is the dimension of the associated fixed point problem. The NFXP
algorithm has been sucessfully programmed on an IBM-PC and applied to estimate a
model of bus engine replacement where the fixed point dimension was at most 180
(Rust, (1987)). By comparison, the fixed point dimension for the retirement
problem can be as large as several million.
This paper shows how to apply the NFXP algorithm to the retirement problem
and demonstrates how to exploit the algebraic structure of the fixed point
problem in order to rapidly compute high-dimensional fixed points on parallel
vector processors like the Cray-2. With this technology one can formulate more
realistic models of retirement behavior. Section 2 reviews some of the empirical
issues that motivated the construction of the model. Section 3 develops the
model, formulating the retirement decision process as a discrete control
process. Section 4 presents computational results which show that fixed points
as large as several million dimensions can be rapidly and accurately calculated
on the Cray-2. A future paper will use the NFXP algorithm and data from the
longitudinal Retirement history Survey (RHS) to actually estimate the unknown
parameters of the model.
32. Empirical motivation for the dynamic programming model
The "a priori" structure of the dynamic programming model has been heavily
influenced by my interpretation of the extensive empirical literature on
retirement and consumption/savings behavior that has arisen over the last 20
years. This section summarizes some of the basic empirical and policyissues of
the retirement process that I wanted the model to capture.
2.1 Accounting for unplanned events and the sequential nature of decision-making
Several existing models, such as Anderson, Burkiiauser and Quinn (1984), and
Burtless and Moffitt (1984), studied retirement behavior in the context of a
two-period model that divided time into a pre-retirement and post-retirement
phase. At some initial "planning date" before retirement, the worker is assumed
to choose a fixed optimal retirement date and fixed pre-retirement and post-
retirement consumption levels. Anderson, Burkhauser and Quinn used data from the
RHS survey to find out how closely workers' followed their initial retirement
plans. In the initial 1969 wave of the survey non-retired workers reported their
planned retirement age. By tracing workers over the subsequent 10 years they
were able to compare the actual and planned retirement dates, and found that
over 40% of the initial sample deviated from their initial retirement plans by
over one year.
Clearly workers do not make single once andforall plansabout
consumption levels and retirement date. Rather, workers are constantly modifying
their plans in light of new information. Anderson, Burkhauser and Quinn found
that unexpected changes in health, labor market conditions, and government
policy (social security regulations, in particular) were the most important
factors leading to revised retirement plans. This suggests a stochastic dynamic
4programming formulation where the so]ution takes the form of an optimal decisioo
rule that specifies workers' optimal consumption and labor supply decisions as a
function of their current information.
2.2Accountingfor bequests
Many of the early studies of the impact of social security on private
saving were based on the life-cycle consumption hypothesis of Modigliani and
Brumherg (1954). Under the simple life-cycle model with no bequests,1)
consurrption is predicted to remain constant or increse with age (depending on
whether the interest rate is greater than or equal to the subjective discount
rate), 2) workers are predicted to run down their accumulated wealth to zero by
their (certain) date of death, and 3) intergenerational transfers like social
security displace an equal amount of private savings (a greater amount if there
is a net wealth transfer, due to the wealth effect on consumption). Initial work
using cross-sectional data (Mirer (1979), Danziger et. al. (1982), Kurz (1984),
and Henchik and David (1983)) provided evidence that contrary to the simple
life-cycle model, age-wealth profiles are constant. (or possibly increase) with
age, and "the elderly not only do not dissave to finance their consumption
during retirement, they spend less on consumption gnods and services (save
significantly more) than the nonelderly at all levels of iticome" (Danziger et.
al. ,(1982)page 224). A study of consumption profiles using the RHS data by
Hammermesh (1984) found that on average consumption excerds earnings by 14%
early in retirement, but that workers' respond "by reducing consumption at a
rate sufficient to generate positive changes in net financial worth within a few
years after retirement" (page 1). A study of estimated earnings and consumption
paths by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) indicated that intergenerational transfers
5account for the vast majority of the capital stock in the U.S.,withonly a
negligible fraction attributable to life-cycle savings. Direct observations of
bequests from probate records (Menchik and David (1985)) showed that bequests
are a substantial fraction of lifetime earnings. Their results also demonstrated
that bequests are a luxury good, with a "marginal propensity to bequeath" that
is about 6 times higher in the top wealth quintile than in the lower four
quintiles. As a whole, these studies provide a strong case for including
bequests in a properly specified empirical model.
The policy implications of bequests were first pointed out by Barro (1974).
Barro's "equivalence result" shows that under general conditions consumers can
offset the effects of government tax policy (such as social security) by
corresponding changes in private intergenerational transfers. In particular, the
net wealth transfers to social security beneficiaries during the 1970's are
predicted to be completely offset by increases in private savings for bequests.
Recent theoretical and empirical research, however, has questioned the
importance of bequests as a determinant of consumption behaviorduring
retirement. Davies (1981) showed that in a model with imperfect annuities
markets and uncertain lifetimes, risk averse consumers can continueto
accumulate wealth during retirement through a precautionary savings motive even
though there is no bequest motive. Given that lifetimes are not certain, this
creates the empirical problem of distinguishing between intended and accidental
bequests. Recent panel data studies by Diamond and 11ausmn (1984), Bernheim
(1984), and Hurd (1986) found that the elderly do dissave after retirement. Hurd
found that average real wealth in the RHS decreased by 27% over the ten year
period of the survey and concluded that "there is no bequest motive in the RHS,
and, by extension, in the elderly population with the possible exception of the
6very wealthy. Bequests seems to be simply the result of mortality risk combined
with a very weak market for private annuities" (page 35). David and Menchik's
(1985) study also casts doubt on empirical relevance of Barro's equivalence
result. Their regressions of bequests on gross social security wealth and the
lifetime wealth increment LWI (the difference between the. discounted value of
social security receipts and social security taxes), produced no evidence that
bequests increase to offset increases in LWI; in fact, those in the top wealth
quintile appeared to decrease bequests in response to an increase in LWI.
However their results also cast doubt on the Davies variant of the life-cycle
model. To the extent that social security is a replacement for an incomplete
annuities market, one would expect that gross social security benefits would
decrease accumulated private wealth and unanticipated bequests. David and
Henchik found a positive (albeit statistically insignificant) coefficient on
gross social security benefits, and concluded that the "results indicate no
significant effect of social security wealth on the age-wealth profile, a
finding at odds with the life-cycle hypothesis. We find that social security
does not depress or displace private saving and that people do not deplete their
private assets in old age as is commonly assumed." (page 432).
These conflicting theoretical and empirical results suggest the need to
build a model that allows for both uncertain lifetimes and a bequest motive. A
unified treatment may help to sort out their separate effects on the path of
consumption during retirement. However the fact that bequests are not needed to
explain the slow rate of wealth decumulation suggests that it will be very
difficult to separately identify workers' subjective discount factors, the
parameters of their bequest functions, andtheirsubjectivemortality
probability distributions.
72.3 Accounting for the joint endogeneity of labor supply and savings decisions
The decline in labor force participation rate of older males over the past
30 years is a well-known phenomenon; the participation rate for workers aged 55-
64 declined from 86.8% in 1960 to 72.3% in 1980, and the rate for workers aged
65+ declined from 33.1% to 19.1% over the same period. Nany people have blamed
this decline on the historical increase in social security retirement benefits,
which increased in real terms by more than 50% from 1968 to 1979, the decade of
the R}1S survey. Savings rates have also declined in the postwar era, from an
average of 8.8% in the 50's, 8.7% in the 60's, 7.7% in the 70's, to only 5.1%
since 1980. Some researchers including Feldstein (1974) have claimed that social
security "depresses personal saving by 30-50 percent" (Feldstein (1974), page
905). However according to economic theory an actuarially fair social security
program should have no effect on aggregate savings or labor supply decisions,
simply inducing a 1for 1 displacement of private savings by public savings
(Crawford and Lilien (1982)). It is well known, however, that the social
security benefit formulas are not actuarially fair, with strong incentives for
early retirement (especially beyond age 65, see Burtless and Noffitt (1984)).
However if workers' increase their savings to prepare for earlier retirement,
then the theoretical impact of social security on aggregate savings is
ambiguous: the decreased savings due to the tax and wealth transfer effects may
be offset by the increased savings due to the early retirement effect.
Empirical work designed to resolve these questions has failed to provide
clear conclusions about social security's impact on labor supply and savings
behavior. While analyses of labor supply decisions generally agree that social
security does induce earlier retirement, there is substantial disagreement over
the magnitude of the effect. Some studies such as Boskin and Hurd (1974) find a
8substantial impact, while others such as Sueyoshi (1986) find a moderate impact,
and still others such as Burtless and Moffitt (1984) and Fields and Mitchell
(1985) find a very small impact; in fact, the latter study found that a 10%
decrease in benefits would increase the average retirement age by at most 1.7
months. Studies of social security's impact on aggregate savings are in
disagreement about even the sign of the effect. For example Barro (1978) used
the same time series data as Feldstein (1974) and an alternative measure of
social security wealth and found that increases in social security increased
aggregate savings. He concluded that "the time-series evidence for the United
States does not support the hypothesis that social security depresses private
saving." (page 1). Studies using longitudinal data such as Xotlikoff (1979) have
generally found that social security reduces private saving, hut have not found
the 1for 1 displacement of private savings that the simple life-cycle model
predicts. Kotlikoff's results show a partial offset ranging from 40 to 60 cents
for every additional dollar of social security benefits; the increased savings
due to early retirement did not turn out to be large enough to offset social
security's negative tax and wealth transfer effects.
A careful analysis of the impact of changes in social security benefits
requires a model that treats labor supply and consumption as jointly endogenous
decisions. Although a model that focuses on the last stage of the life-cycle
probably won't be able to shed much light on social scnrity's impact on
aggregate savings, it should address the historical decline in labor force
participation of older men. The discrepancies in previous empirical results
emphasize the need to carefully model the actuarial and benefit structure of the
social security system, and if possible, to model workers' expectations and
uncertainties about changes in future benefits.
92.4 Accounting for health and the impact of social security disability insurance
Health problems are a major source of uncertainty in retirement planning,
especially in terms of lost earning potential arid unanticipated health care
costs. Data from the NLS and RHS surveys indicate that poor health is a major
factor in retirement decisions, especially among early retirees. Of the people
retired in the 1969 wave of the RHS survey, 65% reported they were retired due
to poor health; for those who had been out of the labor force for more than 6
years (the early retirees) the figure was 82%. Health problems are prevalent
even among those who work; 39% of the 1969 RHS sample reported a health problem
that limited their ability to work or get around, even though 63% of this group
continued to work at a full or part-time job. However the inherent subjectivity
of self-reported health measures arid the financial incentives for claiming poor
health in order to receive disability payments have lead some to question the
accuracy of health variables and the importance of poor health as a cause of
retirement (Parsons, (1982)). In fact, some researchers (Bound, (1986)) have
presented evidence (see figure 1) that suggests that much of the decline in the
labor force participation rates of older males over the last 30 years can be
ascribed to increases in disability claims allowed under the social security
disability insurance program instituted in the late 50's and substantially
liberalized during the 70's. Other researchers, such as Kotlikoff (1986),
suggest that disability insurance may also be partly responsible for the decline
in saving rates since it eliminates the need for precautionary saving to insure
against unexpected illness or disability.
(figure 1 here)
To the extent that qualification for disability insurance requires medical
examination, the classification "disabled" is relatively more objective than
10self-reported measures of poor health. However other approaches that use more
"objective" measures of health status such as impairment indices (Chirikos arid
Nestel, (1981)), or ex post mortality (Parsons, (1982), Mott and Haurin,
(1981)), generally obtain results that are in broad agreement with studies that
use self-reported measures of health status (although there are certain
questions for which the alternative measures lead to important differences, see
Chirikos and Nestel (1981), page 113), Regardless of how it is measured, health
status clearly has a significant impact on the labor force participation
decision and appears to be one of the most important variables driving the
dynamics of the retirement process. It is important, however, to find a measure
of health status that doesn't rely heavily on subjective self-assessments) for
example classifying as "disabled" only those who have had doctor certification
of disability (as is required in order to obtain disability benefits). The model
must also incorporate the regulations and uncertainties governing the receipt of
social security disability insurance: only by doing so can we hope to sort out
the relative impact of liberalized disability vs. social retirement benefits on
the declining labor force participation rate of o]der males.
2.5 Accounting for "partial retirement" and multiple labor force transitions
Many models treat retirement as a dichotomous choice between full-time work
and zero hours of work. However economic theory suggests that workers might be
better off if they could make a gradual transition from full-time work into
retirement. Thus, at the other extreme are the labor supply models of Gordon and
Blinder (1980) and MaCurdy (1983) that treat hours of work as a continuous
choice variable. Gustman and Steinmeier (1983), (1984) have shown that a
majority of non self-employed workers face implicit or explicit minimum hour
11constraints that prevent them from gradually phasing out of their full-time
jobs. Their analysis of the RI-IS data showed that approximately onethird of all
workers attempt to circumvent the minimum hours constraint through a spell of
"partial retirement" in a part-time job. This suggests that a trichotomous
choicemodel with the alternatives full-time work, part-time work, and
retirement may be a better approximation to the actual choice sets facing
workers than either the binary or continuous-choice formulations.
The RHS data show substantial variation in the paths workers follow into
retirement. Table 1 presents the sequence of self-reported labor market states
in the first 4 waves of the RHS.
(table I here)
Table Iindicates that one needs at least a three alternative choice set to
adequately explain the variety of labor force transitions that occur along the
path to retirement. Table 1 also indicates that the transition into retirement
seems to be nearly an absorbing state; very few people "unretire" by re-entering
a full-time job once fully or partially retired, (or part-time job once fully
retired). These numbers differ significantly from labor market re-entry rates
presented by Diamond and Hausrnan (1984b) using NLS data. Table 2 reproduces
their estimates of the fraction of men in the NLS survey that re-enter full-time
work from the state of retirement or partial retirement.
(table 2 here)
A possible explanation for the discrepancy is that Gustman and Steinmeier used a
self-reported measure of labor force status to construct Table 1.2 The concept
of "retirement" is ambiguous: is someone who quits their full-time career job
and takes a part-time job retired? Workers may interpret the concept differently
and respond differently even though they are in identical labor force states.
12This suggests the use of objective measures of labor force status based on
reported hours of work. Furthermore, from a modelling standpoint it seems
undesirable to impose a priori constraints such as making retirement an
absorbing state, or prohibit various transitions to and from different labor
market states. The model should have the flexibility to allow the data and the
estimated parameter values "explain" what types of transitions actually occur.
Developing a tractable empirical model that incorporates all these features
is a challenging undertaking. Certainly a unified model will lack some of the
fine detail of previous models that focused on specific aspects of the
retirement process. However the most important cost is the computer time
required to solve and estimate the model. To my knowledge there is no simple
analytic solution to the model I present in the next section:it seems to
require numerical solution, a substantial computational task. Before presenting
the model, I should answer a natural question: isn't there a better way to
estimate the model than by "brute-force" numerical solution of the dynamic
programming problem? In particular, MaCurdy (1983) developed a relatively simple
scheme for estimating an intertemporal model of labor supply and consumption in
the presence of taxes and uncertainty. Why not use HaCurdy's method? MaCurdy's
approach is not well-suited to the retirement problem due to his assumption that
consumption and hours of work are continuous choice variables. This allows
MaCurdy to derive first order conditions for the stochastic dynamic programming
problem that equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure to the real wage rate. This provides a computationally convenient
"orthogonality condition" to estimate the identified parameters of the model.
Unfortunately, the method depends critically on the assumption that workers do
13not face minimum hours constraints in their full-time jobs,and that one always
has an interior solution with positive values for consumption andhours of work.
MaCurdy recognizes this: "because the procedure ignoresstatistical problems
relating to the endogeneity of labor decisions, (it is)of limited use in
estimating period-specific utilities associated with householdsin which corner
solutions for hours of work are not a certainty. .. suchas households with wives
and older households where retirement may occur" (HaCurdy (1983), page 277). The
next section presents a model and estimation algorithm that canaccomodate
minimum hours constraints and corner solutions, hut at thc cost of repeated
numerical solution of the dynamic programming problem over the course of the
maxirrurn likelihood estimation procedure.
143. Theoretical formulation of the dynamic programming mode]
This section presents a theoretical mode] of retirement behavior that
attempts to account for some of the empirical issues raised in section 2. The
ultimate goal is to estimate and test the mode] using the RHS panel data. The
primary factors limiting the realism of the model are computational feasibility,
arid the availability of good data. The construction of the theoretical model
reflects these practical constraints. In particular, the R}IS has limited dataon
private pension plans, so I restrict the model to male heads of household with
no private pensions. Given the negligible use of private annuities and health
plans among RHS respondents, it follows that social security is the predominant
source of both retirement and health insurance benefits for this subsample.
3.1 State and control variables
In order to represent the fundamental dynamics of retirement behavior the
model should include the following "state variables" whichdirectlyor
indirectly affect workers' realized utility levels:
accumulated financial and nonfinancial wealth
total income from earnings and assets
aw: the social security "average monthly wage"
h : health status of worker (good health/poor health/disabled/dead)
age of worker
e : employment status (full-time/part-time/not employed)
ms: marital status (married/single)
The state variables represent (a subset of) workers' current information that
affects their expectations about their remaining lifespan, futureearnings and
15retirement benefits, and their future health and family status. Since social
security retirement and disability benefits are determined from the worker's
primary insurance amount (a function of aw, which is in turn a complicated
weighted average of past earnings), the variable aw summarizes the worker's
expectations of future benefits accruing to him in retirement or disability,
assuming fixed social security rules governing timing and eligibilty for
benefits. Since it is very difficult to formulate a low-dimensional state
variable representing how the social security benefit structure changes over
time, I assume that workers' had "semi-rational" expectations of the benefit
structure, equal to the regulations in force as of 1973. Although real benefits
increased 51.2% between 1968 and 1979, the majority of the increase, 46.7%, was
in effect by 1973 (see Anderson, Burkhauser and Quinn, (1984)). The 1973 Social
Security Act also changed the ttearnings test" to reduce the 100% tax on earnings
beyond the previous earnings limit to a 50% tax on all earnings over $2,100.I
describe the expectations assumption as "semi-rational" because I assume that
workers correctly anticipated the cumulative changes in social security that
came into effect over the period 1969-1973, but maintained static expectations
that no further changes would occur thereafter.
Given these expectations, at each time t the worker must choose values of
the following ttcontrol variables":
d: the employment decision (full-time/part-time/exit labor force)
c: the level of planned consumption expenditures
The worker's sequential decision problem is to choose at each time t values for
the control variables itE(c,d) that maximize the expected discounted value of
16utility over his remaining lifetime, where his expectations are conditionedby
the current values of the state variablesxt(wt,h,a ,ms ,e,y,aw). The goal
is to specify a model that is parsimonious, yet rich enough to allow forcertain
kinds of heterogeneity. Perhaps the most important source ofheterogeneity is
differences in workers' attitudes towards retirement. Some workersmay be
"workaholics" who prefer working to the idle leisure ofretirement, whereas
others are "leisure lovers" who would jump at the chance toquit their jobs.
Notice that the formulation distinguishes between the worker'semployment
state and his employment decision. This feature allows the model toaccount for
various labor force transitions, including "unretJrement" andjob search
behavior, summarized in Table 3.
(table 3 here)
3.2 Formulating retirement behavior as discrete controlprocess
I model retirement behavior as a discrete controlprocess, a discrete-time
markovian decision problem where the control variable is restrictedto a finite
set of alternatives. This framework represents workers' preferencesas a
discounted sum of a state-dependent utility functionu(x,i), and their
expectations as a markov transition probability n(xt+1Ix,i). "Blackwell's
Theorem" (Blackwell, (1965), Theorem 6) establishes that undervery general
conditions, the solution to a markovian decision problem ta1es the form of a
decision rule it=ft(x) that specifies the agent's optimal actioni in state
x. Note, however, that if the econometrician is assumed to observe the complete
state vector x, this framework implies that knowledge of the trueutility
function u would enable him to solve for f and perfectlypredict the agent's
choice in each state x, producing a degenerate statistical model. Apossible
17solution is to "add an error term" in order to obtain a nondegenerate
statistical model of the form it(x)t. Unfortunately, such ad hoc solutions
are internally inconsistent: the economic model assumes that the agent behaves
optimally, yet the statistical implementation of the model assumes that the
agent randomly departs from optimal behavior. One wants a framework that can
account for the fact that the agent has information t.thatthe econometrician
doesn't observe. By incorporating such unobserved st8te varL'ihles one obtains a
non-degenerate, internally consistent statistical model generated by optimal
decision rules of the form i=f(x,c). Rust (1986) developed a formal
statistical framework for structural estimation of discrete markovian decision
problems with unobserved state variables. The following table summarizes the
basic structure of the problem:
(table 4 here)
The solution to the decision problem consists of a sequence of decision-rules or
controls that maximize expected discounted utility over an infinite
horizon.Define thev8lue function Vby
(3.1) V(x,E)sup(3t)tu(x f)+t(f)] x,t}
11j=t
where ,f(x,t)EC(xt)
for all t,x,and and where
the expectation is taken with respect to the transition density for the
controlled stochastic process determined from ITand the transition
density p(x+1,tt+1x,tt,i). Under general conditions specified in Rust (1986),
the value function V will be the unique solution to Bellman's equation
18(3.2)V(x,t) max [u(x,i)+t(i)+EV(x,t,i)]
iEC(x)
where the function EV(x,t,i) is defined by
(3.3) EV(x,E,i)crV(y,)p(dy,diiIx,c,i).
Blackwell's Theorem implies that the solution II is st8tIonary 11f,f,f,..., and
rnarkoviarisothe agent's optimal decision rule i=f(x,) depends only on the
current values of he state variables, determined by finding the alternative i
that attains the maximum in Bellman's equation
(3.4) f(x,c)argrnax [u(x,i)+c(i)+EV(x,t,i)].
iC(x)
The sample likelihood function is derived from the conditionalchoice
probabilities P(iIx), which are obtained from the agent's optimal decision rule
1f(x,t) by integrating out over the unobserved state variable c using the
conditional density of t given x. From equation (3.4) one can see that the
unobservables enter nonlinearly in the conditional expectation of the value
function, EV(x,t,i). Under standard distributional assumptions for the
unobservables, will be continously distributed on RN, where NtC(x). This
raises serious computational difficulties, since calculation of P(ilx) will
ordinarily require N-dimensional numerical integration over tin the optimal
decision rule defined by (3.4). However, the expected value function EV(x,t,i)
entering (3.4) will almost never have a convenient analytic formula, but must be
computed by numerically integrating the value function V in (3.3). The value
19function must in turn be numerically computed by solving V as a functional fixed
point to Bellman's equation (3.2). Since tisa vector of continuous state
variables, it must be discretized in order to compute V on a digital computer.
The discretization procedure approximates the true function V, an element of an
infinite-dimensional Banach space B, by a suitable vector in a high-dimensional
Euclidean space. Even with a very coarse grid approximation to the true
continuous distribution of the dimensionality of the resulting discrete
approximation will generally be too large to be computationally tractable. These
computational problems motivated Rust (1986) to make the following assumption on
the joint transition density for
Conditional Independence Assumption: The markov transition density factors as
(3.5) iEC(x).
This assumption involves two restrictions. First,x1 is a sufficient statistic
for which implies that any statistical dependence between and is
transmitted entirely through the vector Second, the probability density
for x1 depends only on x and i, and not on Although (3.5) is a strong
assumption, Rust (1987) developed a simple LaGrange multiplier statistic to test
its validity. The payoff to assumption (3.5) is given by the following theorems
of Rust (1986).
20Theorem 1: Let G(v(x)Ix) denote the Soci8l Surplus function, definedby
(3.6) G(v(x)Ix) max [v(x,i)+t(i)Jq(dEx)
iEC(x)
and let G.(v(x)Jx) denote the partial derivative of G(v(x)Ix) with
respect to v(x,i). Then under assumption (35)3theconditional
choice probability P(iFx) is given by
(3.7) P(ilx)=G.(v(x)Ix) iEC(x)
where the function v is the unique fixed point to the contraction
mapping v=T(v) defined by
(3.8) v(x,i) =u(x,i)+(G(v(y)y).n(dyx,j)iEC(x).
The function v is related to the value function V defined in (3, 1)
and (3.2) by
(3.9) V(x,t) =max[v(x,i)+(i)J.
itC(x)
Theorem 2: Under assumption (3.5) the controlled stochasticprocess ti,x} is
markovian with transition density givenby
(3.10)
Products of the transition density given in (3.10) form the likelihood
function for the process This function is difficult to evaluate
21primarily because the conditional choice probability P(ilx) requires calculation
of the value function v as a fixed point of the contraction mapping (3.8).
Theorem 1 shows that from the standpoint of evaluating (3.10), there are two
major payoffs to assumption (3.5). First, it implies that c does not enter the
expected value function EV(x,t,i), so that tentersV only additively as shown
in (3.9). This implies that the conditional choice probabilities P(ilx) for the
dynamic discrete choice model are given by exactly the same formulas as for
static discrete choice models, except that the relevant utility function is not
the static utility function u, but the fixed point v of the contraction mapping
(3.8). Second, assumption (3.5) implies that the dynamic programming problem can
besolved bycomputingthefixedpointv=T(v)overthespace
r=(x,i)xEvM,iEc(x)}. This is a much easier task than computing the fixed point
V(x,t) over the direct state space V (x,t)xE,tE1,N#C(x)} since £isa
continuous-valued N-dimensional vector which must be discretized into values
(where K is the diameter of the grid for t),whereasthe argument i entering
v(x,i) is already discrete and assumes at most N values.
Given a parametric specification for the unknown objects u, q and11,one
can "recover" the agent's underlying preferences (,u) and expectations (ii,q) by
finding parameter values that maximize the likelihood function, This suggests
the following "nested fixed point algorithm": an "outer" non-linear optimization
algorithm searches for parameter vector 0that maximizes the likelihood
function, and an "inner" fixed point algorithm re-calculates the fixed point v0
of (3.8) each time the outer optimization algorithm updates its estimate of 8.
Rust (1986) showed that under certain regularity conditions, the NFXP algorithm
produces consistent and asymptotically normally distributed parameter estimates.
Before presenting parametric specifications for u, q and i,Ishould
22mention some drawbacks of the discrete control formulation. Although I have
argued that there are good reasons for treating the employment decisiondt as
discrete, both time t and the consumption decision appear to be better
approximated by continuous variables. Ny apology is thatthediscrete
formulation seems to be the best available compromise given the computational
and data limitations Iface. The computational limitation is that to my
knowledge, there are no estimation algorithms available for continuous-time
stochastic control problems, or for dynamic programming models where the
decision variable is mixed discrete/continuous.' The data limitation is that
individuals in the RHS are sampled at two year intervals with only limited
retrospective information on their states and decisions between survey dates. In
theory, one could formulate a very fine grain discrete-time model (regarded as a
closeapproximation to the actual continuous-time decision process) and
"integrate out" the dates for which no data are available, but the computational
burden required to solve the model and perform the integrationsappears to be
prohibitive. Therefore Iinterpret the decisions it(dt,c) as "plans", as of
date t, that are revised at the same two-year time intervals as thesurvey
dates. Thus, the state variablesx refer to the worker's state at time t, and
the decisions i(d,c) refers to the worker's plans regarding consumption and
labor force participation over the next two years. The plans need not be
fulfilled, hence there will be a conditional probability distribution for the
state x1 at time t+l conditional on the current statex, and plan i(d,c)
chosen at time t. Under this interpretation it is much more natural to regard
the choice of a "consumption plan"c as an interval rather than a specific
number since there will be unforseen future events that cause actual consumption
to deviate from the plan. The use of consumption intervals also helps mitigate
23the effects of the inevitable errors in variables in the constructed consumption
data.5 Since I do not actually observe the consumption t1plan" chosen by the
worker in the RHS, in the empirical implementation of the model I will assume
that the consumption intervals are sufficiently wide that the ex post realized
consumption interval coincides with the ex ante plan.
3.3 Specification of Workers' Preferences
The following table summarizes the formulation of the retirement problem as
a discrete control process.
(table 5 here)
Death, quite naturally, is treated as an absorbing state and the bequest
function specifies the utility of entering this state. The dynamic programming
problem proceeds by backward induction from the (uncertain) age of death over
two-year time intervals back to an initial age, 58, the age of the youngest
respondent in the first wave of the RHS.
It remains to specify the functional forms for b, u, ,andq.' The NFXP
algorithm places no restrictions on the functional forms for b, u, and n but
computational tractability appears to require that thedistributionof
unobservables q be a member of McFadden's (1981) "Generalized Extreme Value"
(GEV) family.7 The GEV family is closed under the operation of maximization,
leading to convenient closed-form expressions for the social surplus function
(3.6) and its derivatives, the choice probabilities (3.7). This feature greatly
simplifies the NFXP algorithm, avoiding the numerical integrations that are
normally required for other multivariate distributions.I chose a particular
member of this family whose cumulative distribution function Q(t,8) is given
below
243J
(3.11) Q(c,04) =exp-Z [Z
exp{t(6,j)/O45}04Ei}, 6=1,2,3,
5=1 j=1
Since the corresponding density q does riot depend on x,it follows that the
unobserved state variables are serially independent in this specification.
Formula (3.11) includes the standard multivarjate extreme value distributionas
a special case when 845=13 5=1,2,3. The latter distribution satisfies the well-
known hAproperty:the components t(5,j) and E(d,c) are contemporaneously
independent when dhen 8 are not all equal to 1 one obtains a
pattern of contemporaneous correlation in the components ofc represented by
the following choice tree
(figure 2 here)
Thus, (3.11) allows correlation in the unobserved state variables affecting the
consumption decision c given the labor supply decision d, but assumes
independence in unobserved state variables corresponding to different labor
supply choices. Formula (3.11) yields the following nested Jogit formulas for
the conditional choice probabilities
(3.12) P(d,cIx,O)P(cx,d,8)P(dx,8)
where P(c!x,d,8) and P(d!x,O) are given by
(3.13) P(cx,d,O) =exPvO(x,c,d)/84d}
J
Z exPv8(x,j)d)/O4}
j=1
25(3.14) P(djx,O) = exptl(d)04d}
3
Z exp1I(6)O45
6=1
andwhere the Inclusive V8lue, 1(d),isdefined by
J
(3.15) 1(d)ln[Z expvO(x,d,j)/O4d}] d1,2,3.
j=l
Finally (3.11) yields an explicit formula for the fixed point condition (3.8)
(3.16) v8(x,d,c) =
u(x,d,c,O2)+fln[ ! [!expv0(y,6,j)/O45fl°4ó](dyx,d,c,83)
y6=1 j=1
withthe implicit "terminal condition" that v8(x,d,c)b(w,ms,01) if hs"dead".
It remains to specify the functional forms for the bequest and utility
functions, b and u.I assume that the bequest function has the following
functional form
(3.17) b(w,ms,8i)w°h1(912+Oi3ms)
Thecoefficient O will reflect a diminishing or increasing marginal utility of
26bequests depending on whether is greater or less than 1. The David and
?lenchik study discussed in section 2.3 suggests that possibly 811>1. Presumably
a married worker obtains greater utility from bequests to remaining spouse than
from bequests to friends, institutions, or the government. Thus, I expect that
013 is positive.
The utility function is slightly more complicated; I assume that it has the
following functional form
(3.18)u(d,c,e,h,a,ms,02) =
33
][e°2hh][O2i2+O2ia+O2ims+O2i5hsJ
i=1 j=l
'
Accordingto (3.18), utility is a function of consumption, c, and the level of
leisure,e. Ranking the employment states as lft, 2pt, and 3ne, I expect the
coefficient shouldbe negative for a leisure lover,aridpositivefor a
"workaholic't. The coefficient 8210 should be positive and less than 1 if there
is diminishing marginal utility of consumption. The basic utility obtained from
consumption and leisure is modified by the last factor in (3.18) which accounts
for health status, age, marital status, and the presence of children. Ranking
the health states as lgood health, 2fair health, 3disabled, I expect that the
coefficient 02 should be negative; being in worse health diminishes the
utility obtained from consumption or leisure (or work, if he is a work-lover).
It is not clear what sign to expect for the coefficient 07j3 on the age
variable. Perhaps as one gets older, one's remaining lifetime becomes more
precious, suggesting a positive coefficient. However aging might also result in
27general mental and physical deterioration independent of that captured by the
health variable, suggesting a negative sign. One would ordinarily expect the
presence of a spouse would increase the worker's utility, suggesting a positive
value for 02Ih
The final term in (3.18) is the double summation term that reflects the
monetary and psychic "search costs" of changing employment states. Perhaps the
hardest transition to make is from the retired state to find a new full-time
job. This suggests the coefficient on I{d=1,e31 should be a large negative
number, reflecting the data in table I of section 2.5 that very few retired
workers ever "unretire" and return to work at a full-time job. On the ether
hand, it should be relatively easy to make the reverse transition and retire
from either a full or part-time job; Id3,e1 or Id3,e2}. Thus, the
coefficients on these terms should be positive, possibly reflecting the utility
value of any retirement bonuses or incentives. I would also expect that it is
relatively easier to move into a part-time job from a full-time job than vice
versa, so I expect the coefficient on I[d2,e1) to exceed the coefficient for
Idl,e2}. To the extent that workers desire to make a gradual transition from
work to retirement, the coefficient on I{d2,efl should be positive, reflecting
the prevalence of "partial retirement" discussed in section 2.5. The remaining
coefficients reflect the utility costs of decisions to remain in the current
employment state; Id3,e3J, Id2,e21, and I[d1,el}. For leisure lovers,
there should be disutility associated with the decision to continue working,
hence I expect the coefficient on I{dl,el to be negative, but substantially
less than coefficients for Itdl,e2) or Idl,e3}. The workers who do
partially retire might enjoy the experience, so it is possible that the
coefficient for Id2,e21 is positive. In any case, it should be easier to
28remain on a current part-time job than to find a new one, so the coefficient for
Id=2,e=2} should exceed the coefficients for Itd=2,e=lJ or I1d2,e=3. Of all
the decisions, it is perhaps easiest to remain retired; thus at least for
leisure lovers I expect that the coefficient for I{d=3,e=3} to be positive.
The primary source of population heterogeneity that I wish to account for
is the distinction between work lovers and leisure lovers. Rather than treat
this as unobserved heterogeneity, one can use the responses from attitudinal
questions in the RHS to classify each worker as a "work lover" or "leisure
lover", interacting this taste variable with the coefficients of u that can be
expected to differ between work lovers and leisure lovers. One can account for
additional heterogeneity by making certain parameters functions of time-
invariant socio-demographic variables, the most important of which are race and
the worker's main career occupation and industry.
3.4 Specification of workers' expectations
Having specified the general form of the worker's per period objective
function, it remains to specify the law of motion for the state variables. I
assume that the observed state vector evolves
according to a parametric markov transition density 1T(xt+lIxt,it,03) that
depends on the worker's consumption and labor supply decision i(d,c). The
transition density embodies the worker's expectations about his future health,
his lifespan, and the future levels of income and his stock of wealth. More
precisely, I assume that workers' individual expectations about future values of
the state variables coincide with the population behavior of these variables (as
represented by the estimated transition density 11)withineach socio-demographic
stratum.
29Since the transition probability
iTonlydepends on observable variables
one could in principle use non-parametricmethods to estimate it. With
a discrete state space, the non-parametricestimate of ir(x+1Ixt,it) is simply
the number of transitions (x+i,xt,it) divided bythe total number of
transitions of the form summed over all states y. However with a
large number of discrete cells and a limited amountof data, the non-parametric
estimate of iTwillbe identically zero for many transitions (xt+i,x,it) even
though it is clear that such transitions can actually occurwith positive
probability. Therefore it is preferable to use parametricfunctional forms for i
that"smooth out" the data on state transitions to yield positive estimatesfor
all transition probabilities that are logically possible.It is also desirable
touse flexible functional forms thatdon't impose arbitrary a priori
restrictions on possible transitions. The conditional logitmodel (with full
sets of alternative-specific dummies and sufficient termsfor interactions of
different explanatory variables) is an ideal candidate. However, giventhe very
large number of possible states for a single joint estimation of n is out
of the question. It is much simpler to decomposeas a product of conditional
probabilities for each component x(m), resultingin a series of tractable
conditional logit estimations where the number of alternatives equalsthe
(relatively small) number of values that each component x(m) can assume.Since
a multivariate probability density can always be decomposedas a product of the
conditional and marginal densities of its components, there is noloss in
generality in this approach.
The state variable a representing the worker's age has the simplestlaw of
motion: a÷ia+2. To keep a in a finite number of cells,I will assume that
30there is a maximum age of say 98 years which is treated as an absorbing state.
This does not necessarily imply that all people die with probability 1 at age
98, rather the model simply does not account for further increases in the
mortality hazard beyond age 98. For all practical purposes, however, the
mortality rate for men over age 90 is so high that there is no effective loss in
generality from assuming that all workers die with probability 1 at age 98, an
assumption that leads to substantial computational simplifications as I show in
section 4. Therefore I assume that life ends with probability 1at age 98 or
before, implying that a takes on 20 values in increments of 2 from a starting
age of 58.
The state variable ht representing health takes on one of four values,
l,2,3,4}, where 1 denotes good health, 2 denotes a health condition which the
respondent reports to limit his ability to get around or work (yet which is not
so severe that the worker is actually disabled), 3 denotes that the worker has
been certified by a doctor to be disabled (and hence is not working and is
eligible for social security disability benefits), and 4 denotes the absorbing
state of death. States 1 and 2 are obviously somewhat subjective in nature.
State 3, on the other hand, is much less subjective since social security has
fairly strict rules regarding doctor certification of disability in order for a
worker to receive disability benefits. According to social security rules, any
person receiving disability benefits cannot work, so the employment state for a
person with h3 should be the singleton ene1. It is possible, however, for a
disabled person to try to search for a job at the risk of losing his disability
benefits. Thus, even though a person is disabled I allow the worker the full set
of employment decisions, d[ft,pt,ne}. This allows me (in at least a crude way)
31to study the effect of disability insurance on workers' incentives to re-enter
the labor force.Transitions between health states l,2,31 obey a parametric
transition probability of the form
(3.19)
which gives the probability of health next period as a function of health this
period, age, marital status, employment status, wealth, and the labor supply and
consumption decisions. The function T can be taken to have a trinomial logit
form, with separate coefficients for each of the independent variables and their
interactions. The estimated health transition probability can be interpreted as
accounting for workers' perceptions of the "leniency" of admission to the
disability program. To see this, note that the conditional probability that
ht+13 given ht=2 can be interpreted as a worker's chances of getting onto the
disability roles given that he is not in good health at time t.Aseparate
binomial logit probability function captures workers' mortality assessments as a
function of their age and other state variables x.
A binomial logit probability function will also be used to capture the
stochastic process for ms, worker marital status, as a function of the state
variables x and decision variables (ct,d). Marital status takes on two states,
married or single. A married man may lose his wife through death or divorce, but
once single, is allowed to remarry.
The state variable e representing the worker's employment status takes on
three values [ft,pt,ne), corresponding to full-time work, part-time work, and
not in the labor force, respectively. The conditional probability density for
e+1 has a trinomial logit form
32(3.20).n(ele,a,ms,w,h,y,d;o).
It is particularly important to allow for the effects of age and health on re-
employmentprobabilities. Wealth and income are included as proxys for
unobserved job skills which may make the worker more employable: presumably
wealthier, higher income workers have better job skills and are thus more
employable. I include last period employment status e to control for any
structural state dependence due to past lapses into unemployment or retirement.
Presumably there is more "stigma" to being unemployed rather than retired, so
that an unemployed worker might face lower probabilities of re-employment than a
retired person. Thus, the model might be able to provide some insight into the
"discouraged worker effect" wherein a worker decides to retire rather than face
the frustration of trying to search for a new job. I expect that a workers'
chance of being fired from his current job to increase with age and poor health,
to decrease with "experience" as proxied by his current income and wealth, y
and w. I also expect that full-time jobs to be more secure than part-time jobs.
Handatory retirement beyond a certain age can be incorporated as a probability 1
chance of being fired when a exceeds the retirement age.
It remains to describe the transition probability function for wealth, w.
The standard budget equation is that wealth next period equals wealth this
period plus earnings, income from investments, less consmuption expenditures:
(3.21)
Thus, predicting next period's wealth reduces to predicting next period's
33earnings conditional on a specific choice of consumption interval c. This
requires estimating a transition density for total income y of the form
(3.22)
Here the function ii can be thought of as an earnings function which predicts the
worker's earnings and investment income over the next two years as a function of
his observed state x (including his last period income and employment
decision d. The earnings function captures workers' expectations about their
future earnings streams and the retirement or disability benefits due to them
under social security. For example, if the worker is currently employed full-
time (eft). then TT will predict his next period earnings on his job. These
earnings will be a function of his age and health and level of job experience.
Wealth w and income y are included as proxies for job skills, since presumably
wealth, job earnings and "ability/experience" are highly correlated. n also
includes investment income on existing wealth, whereis a random rate of
return on the worker's investment portfolio. Wealth will be measured to include
both real and financial wealth, including real estate, the cash value of
insurance policies, and other personal property such as automobiles and
furniture, etc.If the worker is currently unemployed and searching for work
(dpt or d=ft, and ene), then the earnings function predicts the worker's UI
benefits. If the worker is retired, (ene and a￿62), then n predicts the
worker's social security benefits. These benefits are a function of the worker's
average monthly wage, aw (which determines his primary insurance amount and
benefits), and his marital status, ms. i also predicts payments from Social
34Security disability insurance and Medicare in the event the worker is disabled
or in bad health, and the death benefit in the event the worker dies. Thus, the
earnings function iTcompletelyembodies the worker'.s expectations of his future
earnings streams underalleventu8lities, retirement, employment, or
unemployment, and includes contingent payments for health and life insurance.
Changes in social security policy, such as changes in benefit levels or
retirement ages can be represented through appropriate changes in the earnings
function. One can simulate the effects of changes in social security policy by
approriately altering the earnings functionand recomputing the new optimal
retirement strategy. This allows one to quantify how much workers are "hurt" by
a policy change by measuring the lump-sum fee workers would be willing to pay in
order to keep the existing social security rules intact, and to measure how the
policy change alters the probability of retirement for each configuration of the
state variables.
The final state variable is the average monthly wage,awe. As an average of
lifetime earnings, aw will be fairly insensitive to earnings levels and labor
supply choices at the end of the worker's career, especially once it is
discretized. Thus, there are no real dynamics foraw; it is simply an indicator
of the level of benefits coming due to the worker. There is some question as to
whether the average wage need even be included in the model since it should be
very highly correlated with the earnings y on the worker's full-time job and
wealth, w. This is an empirical issue. If aw can be adequately proxied by
andw, I would eliminate it as a state variable to conserve on the
dimensionality of the fixed point problem.
354. Numerical computation of the dynamic programming model
As described in section 3, the revealed preference problem reduces to
estimation of the unknown parameter vector 0(,01,02,03,0,), where O<<l is the
worker's intertemporal discount factor, 0 are the parameters entering the
bequest function b, 82 are the parameters entering the utility function u,03
are the parameters of the transition probability for the observed state
variables iT, and 0, are the parameters of the transition probability for the
unobserved state variables q. The unknown parameters can be estimated be maximum
likelihood method using the following three step procedure:
p_j Estimate the vector 0 entering the transition density 1T(xt+lxt,it,03)
using the partial likelihood function L1(03) defined by
K 5
(4.1) L1(03) II TIir(x+i kt k'1t k'° kl =
(wherek indexes individuals in the RHS sample)
Step 2 Using the initial consistent estimate 03 from step 1, estimate
(,O1,02,8) using the partial likelihood function L2(,81,02,ô3,84)
defined by
K 5
(4.2) L2(,81,62,3,0) 1111 P(i ktk,,0102,03s04fl
k=l t=1
where P is defined by (3.12)-(3.15) and the fixed point condition (3.16)
Step 3 To get correct estimated standard errors and asymptotically efficient
parameter estimates for 8,compute1 Newton-step from the initial
consistent estimate Ôusingthe full likelihood function Lf(O) defined by
(4.3)Lf(O)
k=l P(it÷1kIxt+1k,0)iT(xt+1kjxtk,itk03)
36The nested fixed point algorithm is required only in steps 2 and 3 in order
to compute the value function v8 enteringthe conditional choice probabilities
P. This requires recomputing the fixed point v0 of the contraction mapping
(3.16) each time the outer nonlinear maximization algorithm computes new values
for 0. As discussed in section 3, if there are continuous state variables, then
the fixed point v8 is an element of an infinite-dimensional Bariach space B. The
computational strategy is to discretize the continuous state variables,and in
effect, approximate the infinite-dimensional space B by a high-dimensional
EuclideanspaceRN. The dimension of the fixedpoint problem N is equal to the
number of possible values that I and the discretized valuesthat x can assume.
Suppose that wis discretized into 100 cells, into 5 cells, and c into
cells. Assuming that aw can be proxied by w and the remaining state
variables assume the following number of values: h:4, a:2O, e:S, ms:2, d:3.
The implied fixed point dimension is Thus, a 3.6
milliondimensional fixedpoint must be repeatedly recalculated in the fixed
point subroutine of the nested fixed point algorithm duringthe course of the
parameter search. It Is therefore necessary to find algorithmsto compute high-
dimensionalfixed points as rapidly as possible, say, in less than 30 seconds on
asupercomputer such as the Cray-2.
By Theorem I the fixed point problem can be written as vT(v),where the
contraction operator T is defined in formula (3.16). There are two principal
algorithms for computing contraction fixed points: contractioniterations and
Newton-KantoroVichiterations.Contractioniterationsinvolverepeated
evaluations of the contraction mapping T starting from an arbitraryinitial
estimate v0:
37(4.4) vk+lT(vk)
contraction iteration
The Newton-Kantorovich method converts the fixed point problem into the problem
of finding a zero of a nonlinear operator, (l-T)(v)=D, where 1 is the identity
operator on B and 0 is the zero element of B. This nonlinear equation is then
solved for v using Newton's method:
(4.5) vk+lvk-[I-T'(vk)I 11IT)(vk)
Newton-Xantorovich iteration
where T'(vk) is the Frchet derivative of T with respect to v evaluated at the
point Vk. The method of successive approximations is guaranteed to converge for
contraction mappings, however, the convergence is very slow (especially when
is close to 1). Newton's method has a very rapid quadratic rate of convergence,
however the method is only guaranteed to work in a "domain of attraction" of
points sufficiently close to the true fixed point v. The other disadvantage of
Newton's method is that one must solve an NxN linear system involving the matrix
[I_T'(vk)ll. For large N the time and storage required to solve the linear system
becomes prohibitive.
Although the fixed point problem looks formidahie at first glance, the
retirement problem has special structure that can he exploited in order to
dramatically reduce the computational burden of the fixed point problem. There
are two principal features of the retirement problem that can be effectively
exploited: 1) using the absorbing state of death to induce a backward recursion
for the value function, and 2) exploiting the sparsity structure of the
transition probability matrix representation of n, in particular exploiting the
38deterministic transitions for at and the banded structure of the wealth
transition probabilities. The first feature is based on the observation that in
the absorbing state of death the value function has an 8 priori known functional
form: v0=b. Therefore v8 need only be calcu]ated for the 3 remaining health
states, reducing the effective dimension of the problem from N3.6 million to
N=2.7million.Under the additional assumption that worker's die with
probability 1 beyond some fixed age (say 98), one can compute the fixed pointv8
in a single contraction iteration, essentially by bach'ards induction from the
last year of life (in this case, age 98). From an economic perspective, this is
a relatively innocuous assumption since extremely few workers live beyond age
90. However, without this assumption one is faced with an infinite-horizon
problem since the model places no upper bound on the lifespan of the worker.In
this case a combination of contraction and Newton-Kantorovich iterations are
required in order to compute v0, increasing the required computer time by
several orders of magnitude. Since the assumption of fixed lifespan is
relatively innocuous and leads to substantial computational simplications, I
will adopt it in my empirical work. The second feature, exploiting the sparsity
structure, allows one to economize on the number of storage locations required
to hold the matrix representation of i and significantly reduce the number of
operations needed to evaluate the contraction mapping T (3.16) or solve the NxN
linear system in the Newton-Xantorovich iteration (4.5).
To understand the latter point, consider the work involved in computing a
single evaluation of the contraction mapping T. Once the state vector x is
discretized, the majority of the work is the required integration with respect
to the transition probability u. This isequivalenttoleftmatrix
multiplication of the "vectorized" integrand by the matrix representation of ii.
39HatriX multiplication is a very simple operation that is easily "vectorized" for
maximum efficiency onavector processor like the Cray-2. However, such matrix-
vector multiplications require order N2 multiplications and additions, where N
is the number of discrete cells that x can assume. Even a machine that can
multiply at 400 megafiops (400 million floating point operations per second) can
get quickly bogged down when N exceeds several hundred thousand. It is therefore
essential to reduce the total number of multiplications by exploiting the
sparsity of the matrix representation of n.Unfortunately, standard algebraic
techniques for sparse matrices typically do not perform well on vector
processors owing to the irregular memory reference patterns for their elements,
creating "bank conflicts" that prevent the processors from running at maximum
efficiency with continuously full vector pipelines. For example, even after
extensive modification and optimization of standard sparse linear equation
solvers, the resulting code typically runs slower than 12 megaflops on the Cray-
1 (Duff, (1984)). This is significantly slower than the Cray-i's peak rates of
160 megflops on dense linear algebra problems. The trick, then, is to exploit
the sparsity structure of the transition matrix to reduce the total number of
operations while at the same time attempting to keep the non-zero elements in a
"locally dense" configuration so they can be fed to the vector registers in a
continuous stream, allowing the processors to run uninterrupted at nearly peak
speed.
Figures 3 through 8 depict different "sparsity patterns" for the matrix
representation of n depending on the ordering of the component state variables
in x. 11canbe regarded as a direct product of 3 types of transition matrices,
1) a circulant matrix for a, 2) a banded matrix for w, and 3) a dense matrix
40representing the joint transition matrix for the remaining state variables.
These "component" matrices are depicted in figure 3. By varying the order of
these component matrices in the construction of the direct product, one obtains
different sparsity patterns for i.Figures4, 5, and 6 depict the sparsity
patterns for the orderings (d,w,a), (w,a,d), and (a,d,w), respectively. None of
these orderings is particularly desirable, for they all lead to fairly irregular
and dispersed memory reference patterns. Figure 7 depicts the "optimal" sparsity
pattern, (a,w,d), which produces the maximum amount of local density in the
storage pattern for the matrix elements. The matrix-vector multiplication under
this structure occurs in an outer do-loop over age values Ito 20, calling a
block-banded matrix multiplication subroutine specially designed to keep the
vector pipelines continuously full. Figure 8 shows thepackedstorage
arrangement for the block banded matrices that form the off-diagonal sectors of
This arrangement allows one to fully exploit the sparsity of iwhilekeeping
the vector processor running at nearly maximum efficiency.
(figures 3,4,5,6,7,8 here)
Exploitation of sparsity patterns is particularly important in the infinite
horizon case. For sufficiently high discount factorsit will be optimal to use
Newton-Kantorovich iterations rather than contraction iterations alone, but the
former requires the solution of the linear system involving the matrix [I-
T'(v)]. However it is easy to see that T'(v) is simplytimes the transition
probability matrix for the controlled process which is isomorphic to the
basic transition matrix for it.Thus,for each ordering of the underlying state
variables, the matrix [I-T'(v)J will have the same sparsity pattern as the
matrix representation of itinfigures 4 through 7 except for the l's along the
diagonal. Under the "optimal" ordering (a,w,d), one can see from figure 8 that
41except for the lower (a,a) block, this matrix [I-T'(v)J is already in upper
triangular form.Thus, solving the linear system only requires an LU
factorization of the lower (a,a) block followed by recursive back-substitution
to compute the solution for age groups a-I to 1. Since LU factorization is an
order N3 operation, the time saved under the optimal ordering is proportional to
a3, which amounts to a speed-up of 8,000 times when a20. Further speed-ups can
be obtained by accounting for the block-banded structure of the (a,a) block of
[I-T'(v)]. I have designed a block elimination algorithm which LU factors the
(a,a) block of [l-T'(v)] using a banded Crout decomposition, with elimination
operations that are performed on dxd blocks instead of individual matrix
elements. The matrix [l-T'(v)) has sufficient diagonal dominance that the block
elimination algorithm is numerically stable even though pivot operations only
occurs within the elementary dxd block operations of the block elimination
procedure. Thus, by determining the optimal ordering of state variables one can
design a special linear equation algorithm that fully exploits the sparsity
structure of the [I-T'(v)] matrix while keeping the vector processors running
continuously at nearly peak efficiency. This fortiutous situation allows one to
solve linear systems that are orders of magnitude larger than the largest
systems solvable using standard sparse matrix software.
I conclude with table 6 which presents timings of the fixed point algorithm
on the Cray-2. As one can see, the "finite horizon" assumption that workers die
with probability 1after age 98 allows one to expand the dimension of the
problem by an order of magnitude. The average performance rate of 220 megaflops
is good performance for a single processor bank of the Cray-2.' Overall table 6
demonstrates that one can exploit the power of the supercomputer and the special
structure of the fixed point problem to permit estimation of a fairly realistic
42model of retirement behavior. In future work I plan to usc this technology to
actually estimate the unknown parameters of the model.
(table 6 here)
43"This research is pert of an NBER project on the economics of aging
administered by David Wise, JFK School, Harvard University funded by
National Institute for Aging grant 3 P01 AG05842-01. Cpu time on the
Cray-2 supercornputer was provided under grant SES-8419570 of the
National Science Foundation.
' Burtless and Moffitt (1984) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) provided
two of the most recent structural analyses of retirement behavior.
Burtless and Moffitt allowed state-dependent preferences, but simplified
the sequential decision problem by assuming that pre- and post-
retirement consumption levels are fixed, leading to atwo-stage
approximation to the sequential labor supply/consumption decision.
Gustman and Steinmeier estimated a fully sequential continuous-time
model of consumption and labor supply, however they assumed perfect
certainty and perfect capital markets.
2The authors reported, however, that "the correspondence among outcomes
based on these alternative definitions (i.e. objective measures based
on reductions in hours or wages) is relatively close, and the main
conclusions of the paper remain unchanged using the alternative measure"
(footnote 7, page 405).
3j omit certain regularity conditions needed to insure existence of an
optimal stationary policy. For details, see Rust (1986).
There have been recent advances in estimation methods for static
discrete/continuous choice models by Dubin and McFadden (1984), and
Haneman (1984). However it is unclear whether these methods will extend
to dynamic programming models. An alternative possibility is to attempt
to merge the "orthogonality condition" method of Hansen and Singleton
(1982) with the discrete choice framework of Rust (1986). However a
difficulty with this approach has been to specify a tractable stochastic
process for the continuum of unobservables corresponding to each
possiblevalueof the continuous choice variable. Without such
unobservables, one obtains a statistically degenerate model where the
continuous choice variable is an exact function of other observed
variables in the model.
The RHS has incomplete data on consumption expenditures. Rather than
use this data directly, one can compute consumption from the budget
equation w +iwt+ytc since both income and wealth are measured much
more compee1y and accurately in the RHS. An unfortunate complication
is that the RHS records total income only for even numbered years.
Therefore one must impute income in odd-numbered years based on
retrospective information on labor force status in those years, and a
matched data file on social security earnings available for both even
and odd numbered years.
'These functional forms presented should be viewed as first guesses as
to which specifications will "work". The final specification will be
chosen from the results of a specification search over alternative
functional forms using the NFXP algorithm.
'Recent advances in simulation estimators by McFadden (1986) and Fakesand Pollard (1986) offer the hope of significantly extending therange
of estimable distributions q for the unobservables. However it isnot
clear whether their methods, which depend heavily on thehaving the
simulation errors enter linearly and additively separably,directly
extends to allow simulation instead of integration in the fixedpoint
condition (3.8). In that case the simulation error isno longer
additively separable, and the simulations must increase with the sample
size to avoid inconsistency due to non-linear "errors in variables".
'A simple check of the numericalaccuracy of the method is to compute
the fixed point with b and u identically equal to 1. It iseasy to see
that in this case v0=l/(l-), so the numerical results of the algorithm
can be checked against this exact solution. Running the algorithm in 64
bit single precision with .999999 I found the computed solutionagreed
with the theoretical solution to 12 significant digits.
'A simulation analysis of the Cray-2processor (on a Macintosh PC) by
Lawrence Liddiard (1986) suggests that a singleprocessor .an achieve a
maximum rate of 433 megaflops for dense matrix multiplication. In
practice the highest rates that have been recorded for the University of
Minnesota Cray-2 have been on the order of 360 megaflops. Thesingle
processor average of 220 megaflops reported in table 6 has been acheived
using standard library kernels without special assembly language coding
to optimize the flow of data from common memory to localmemory and the
vector registers and back to common memory. The easiest way toget
significant speed increases is to utilize all four processors of the
Cray-2 simultaneously. The fixed point computation can be fairly easily
decomposed into sets of four independent subtasks (e.g. a separate
processor is dedicated to computing the fixed point v0 and the remaining
processors assigned to computing each of the derivatives av0/o),
allowing a sustainable processing rate of approaching 880 megflops.Table 1: Distributions of Retirement Sequences
One year re-entry rates Two year re-entry rates
Source: Custman and Steinmeier (1986), page 566. The first letter in the
retirement sequence is the individual's status in 1969, the first year .pf the
RHS. The second, third, and fourth letters indicate their status in 1971,
1973, and 1975, respectively. The notation of the letters is: f-working full-
time, p-working part,time, r-fully retired, x-status indeterminant. Sequences
with a frequency less than 0.5% were grouped in the category "others".
Sequence Frequency Sequence Frequency
ffrr 16.2% frxx 1.6%
ffff 14.4 rrrx 1.5
fffr 11.2 fppp 1.4
rrrr 8.6 frrx 1.1
frrr 7.3 prrr 1.1
ffxx 5.4 ffrp 1.1
fffp 4.8 ffpx 0.7
ffpp 2.8 ffpf 0.6
ffpr 2.8 fppr 0.5
ffrx 2.5 pqrr 0.5
rrxx 2.2 others 9.8
fprr 2.1
Table 2: Labor Market Re-entry Rates
Self-described Self-described
retiredor un-Notfull- retiredor un-Notfull-
Age able towork timeworker able uowork timeworker
45-59 18.54 52.55 4.00 53.76
50-54 16.23 46.93 17.68 41.03
55-59 15.94 31.85 10.31 25.23
60-64 13.37 15.45 9.57 7.15
65-69 11.74 5.02 9.04 2.94
Total 14.53 29.48 10.13 16.72Table 3: Accounting for Labor Force Transitions
in the Dynamic Programming Node)
Employment Employment
state, e decision, dt Interpretation
1. ft ft continue working at current full-time job
2. ft Pt quit current fu]l-time job, search for a
new part-time job
3. ft ne if a￿62, retire; if a<62 and disabled,
receive disability insnrance; otherwise
exit labor force
4. pt ft quit current part-time job and search for
a full-time job
5. pt pt continue working at currentpart-time job
6. Pt ne if a￿62, retire; if at<62 and disabled,
collect disability insurance; otherwise
exit labor force
7. ne ft unemployed, disabled, or retired worker
searching for full-time job
8. ne pt unemployed, disabled, or retired worker
searching for part-time job
9. ne ne if a ￿62, remain retired; if a<62 and
disabled, collect disability insurance;
otherwise remain out of labor forceTable 4: Summary of Notation for Discrete Control Problem
Symbol Interpretation
C(x)
Choice set; a finite set of feasible values for the
control variable when the observed state variable
is x.
A #C(x)_dimensional vector of state variables
observed by the agent hut not by the econometrician.
t(I)is interpreted as an unobserved component of
utility of alternative i in time period t.
xx(l),. .. ,x(Hfl An H-dimensional vector of state variables observed by
the agent and econometrician.
u(x,i)+t(i)
Realized single period utility obtained in state
(xt,t) when alternative i is chosen.
Markov transition density for next period state
variable when alternative i is chosen and when the
current state is (x,c).
Table 5: Summary of the Retirement Decision Problem
Item Notation
1. Choice set C(x)l,2,3@fc1,.. .,c},lft, 2pt, 3ne
2. Control vector i=(d,ct); dE{l,2,3, cEc' ,.
. .
3.State vector (observed)
4. State vector (unobserved)
5. Bequest function b(wt,ms,cst,Oi)
6. Utility function
7. Transition density (x) 1T(xt+1Ixt,it,03)
8. Transition density (t) q(cJx,O4)GEV(C(x),O4)
see (3.11)
9. Parameter vector O(B,e1,O2,O3,O)1 1x(1+X1+K24-X,+X)Table 6: Fixed Point Computation Times on the Crv-2
Finite Infinite
Item Horizon Horizon
Age categories, a 20 20
Wealth categories, w 100 ]00
Dense block size, d 50 90
Consumption levels, /c 0 5
Labor decisions, 3 3
Maximum bandwidth (blocks) 10 10
Fixed point dimension, N 300,000 2,700,000
CPUtime(seconds) 14.3 6.9
Average rate (megaflops) 198 220
Times are for 1 processor on the University of Minnesota 4 processor Cray-2
with 256 million word common memory.I-z
w0
w
I—z
Lu0
uJ
a-
MEN, 45-54 YEARS OLD
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
057
35
25
20
15
10
5
0
57
62 67 72 77 82
YEAR
MEN, 55-64 YEARS OLD
62 67 72 77 82
YEAR
FIGURE 1F
FIGURE 2
CI
NE
Cl I S S S SI I S S-
n
 
'
—
4
 
G
)
 
P
1
 
(
.
-
)
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
t
r
i
c
e
s
 
a
 
-
 
m
a
t
r
i
x
 
(
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
n
t
)
 
w
-
 
m
a
t
r
i
x
 
(
b
a
n
d
e
d
)
 
I
 
I
 
1
 
I
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
d
-
m
a
t
r
i
x
 
(
d
e
n
s
e
)
 
d
1
 
u
1
 
u
1
 
d
2
 
l
 
2
 
'
1
 
'
2
 
d
3
 
U
t
 
U
2
 
j
 
'
2
 
d
4
 
U
1
 
U
2
 
1
1
 
1
 
d
5
 
u
1
 
U
2
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
—
—
 
T
Y
d
 
1
 
2
 
W
-
1
 
I
 
'
1
 
'
2
 
d
 
'
1
1
 
'
1
2
 
1
j
3
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
'
i
d
 
!
1
2
2
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
'
2
d
 
.
 
.
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
t
d
l
'
d
2
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
1
d
d
 
(
a
x
a
)
 
(
w
x
w
)
 
(
d
x
d
)
 SPARSITY PATTERN:
(d,w,a)
FIGURE 4_affi_ rramaa
SPARSITY PATTERN:
(w,a,d)
FIGURE 50
,
 
.
 
C
l
)
 
—
 
a
,
 
—
I
 
C
.
,
 
—
 
r
n
 
-
 
a
,
 
-
4
 
'
i
i
 
z
 SPARSITY PATTERN:
(a,w,d)
FIGURE 7s
t
f
l
I
s
J
 
•
 
J
f
l
M
.
 
r
J
n
g
v
i
 
I
J
f
l
 
O
D
R
P
1
I
J
U
 
I
V
U
M
 
I
 
l
i
l
A
 
J
.
+
u
+
1
 
d
x
d
 
b
l
o
c
k
s
 
D
1
 
U
1
 
U
1
2
 
U
1
3
 
0
 
0
 
L
2
,
1
 
0
2
 
U
2
,
1
 
U
2
2
 
U
2
3
 
0
 
L
 
—
i
 
L
 
0
 
-
-
_
-
 
U
 
U
 
1
?
 
U
 
-
 
L
5
,
1
 
L
5
,
2
 
D
5
 
U
5
,
1
 
.
J
5
,
2
 
U
5
,
3
 
.
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
.
 
S
 
•
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
.
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
•
 
S
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
S
 
S
 
L
 
W
-
5
,
1
 
L
 
W
2
 
0
 
W
 
U
 
W
 
U
 
U
 
L
 
W
-
4
t
 
L
 
*
4
,
2
 
D
 
W
-
4
 
U
 
W
-
4
4
 
U
 
W
-
4
,
2
 
U
 
W
-
4
,
3
 
L
 
W
-
3
,
1
 
L
 
W
2
 
D
 
W
 
U
 
w
-
3
1
 
U
 
U
 
W
3
 
L
 
W
-
2
1
 
L
 
W
-
2
,
2
 
D
 
W
-
2
 
U
 
W
-
2
,
1
 
U
 
W
-
2
,
2
 
0
 
L
 
W
-
l
,
1
 
L
 
W
-
1
,
2
 
D
 
W
—
1
 
U
 
W
—
t
,
1
 
0
 
0
 
L
 
W
,
1
 
L
 
W
 
D
 
W
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
w
 
d
x
d
 
b
l
o
c
k
s
 
d
 
D
l
 
U
1
1
 
U
1
1
2
 
U
1
1
3
 
.
 
L
2
1
 
D
2
 
U
2
1
 
U
2
2
 
U
2
3
 
L
3
1
 
L
3
2
 
t
;
 
U
3
,
1
 
U
3
2
 
U
3
3
 
L
4
1
 
L
4
2
 
D
4
 
U
1
 
U
4
2
 
U
4
3
 
L
5
)
1
 
L
5
,
2
 
0
5
 
U
5
)
1
 
U
5
,
2
 
U
5
1
3
 
S
 
S
 
•
 
5
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
•
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
•
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 
L
 
W
-
5
,
i
 
L
 
W
-
5
,
2
 
0
 
W
-
5
 
U
 
W
-
5
,
i
 
U
 
W
-
5
,
2
 
U
 
W
-
5
,
3
 
L
 
W
-
4
,
1
 
L
 
W
4
,
2
 
D
 
U
 
W
-
4
 
W
-
4
,
1
 
U
 
W
4
,
2
 
U
 
W
-
4
,
3
 
L
 
L
 
0
 
U
 
U
 
U
 
—
 
W
-
3
,
2
 
L
 
W
-
2
,
I
W
-
2
,
2
 
W
 
L
 
W
-
3
 
W
3
,
2
 
D
 
U
 
W
-
2
 
W
-
2
,
I
W
-
2
,
2
 
3
 
U
 
L
 
W
-
1
,
l
 
L
 
W
-
1
,
2
 
D
 
U
 
W
-
1
 
W
-
1
,
1
 
L
L
 
W
,
1
W
,
2
 
D
 
W
 
W
 
d
x
d
 
b
l
o
c
k
s
 Bibi iraphy
Anderson, K.H. Burkhauser, R.V. Butler, J.S. (1984)"WorkAfter Retirement: A
Hazard Model of Labor Market Re-entry" manuscript.
Anderson, K.H. Burkhauser, R.V. Quinn, J.F. (1984) "Do Retirement Dreams Come
True? The Effect of Unexpected Events on Retirement Age" DP 1,750-84, Institute
for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Barro, R.J. (1974) "Are Government Bonds Net Worth?" Journal of Political
Economy 82-6,1095-1117.
Barro,R.J. (1978) The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving The American
Enterprise Institute, Washington.
Berndt, E. Hall, B. Hall, R. Hausnian, J. (1974) "Estimation and Inference in
NonlinearStructural Models" Annalsof Economic end Social ITeasurement 3 653-
665.
Bernheini, D. (1984) "Dissaving After Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle
Hypothesis" NBER Working Paper 1409.
Blackwell,D. (1965) "Discounted Dynamic Programming" Annals of Statistics 36,
226-235.
Blinder, A. Gordon, R.H. Wise, D.E. (1983) "Social Security, Bequests, and the
Life-Cycle Theory of Savings" in F. Modigliani and R. Hemming (eds.) The
Determinants of National Saving and Wealth New-York, St. Martin's Press, 89-122.
Bodie, Z. Shoven, J.B. (eds.) (1983) Financial Aspects of the United States
Pension System University of Chicago Press.
Boskin, M. (1977) "Social Security and Retirement Decisions" Economic Inquiry
January.
Boskin, M.J. Kotlikoff, L.J. (1985) "Public Debt and United States Savings: A
New Test of the Neutrality Hypothesis" in K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer (eds.) The
"New Monetary Economics", Fiscal Issues and Unemployment Volume 23, North-
Holland, Anisterdani.
Boskin, M.J. Kotlikoff, L.J. Puffert, D.J. Shoven, J.P. (1986) "Social Security:
A Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations" NBER Working Paper 189.2.
Boskin, H., Hurd, H., (1978) "The Effect of Social Security on Early Retirement"
Journal of Public Economics 10, 361-377.
Boskin, M.J. Shoven, J.B. (1986) "Poverty Among the Elderly: Where are the Holes
in the Safety Net?" NBER Working Paper 1923.
Bound, J. (1986) "The Disincentive Effects of the Social Security Disability
Program" manuscript, University of Michigan.
Burkhauser, R.V. (1980) "The Early Acceptance of Social Security: An Asset
Maximization approach" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 33, 484-492.Burkhauser, R.V. (1979) "The Pension Acceptance Decision of Older Workers"
Journal of Human Resources 14-1, 63-75.
Burkhauser, R.V., Turner, J.A. (1978) "A Time-Series Analysis of Social Security
and its Effect on the Market Work of Men at Younger Ages" Journal of Political
Economy 86, 701-715.
Burtless, G., Aaron, H. (eds) (1984) Retirement and Economic Behavior Brookings
Institution, Studies in Social Economics.
Burtless, G. Moffitt, R.A. (1985) "The Just Choice of Retirement Date and Post-
Retirement Hours of Work" Journal of Labor Economics, April.
Burtless, G., Moffitt, R. (1984) "The Effect of Social Security Benefits on the
Labor Supply of the Aged" in Burtless, Aaron (eds) Retirement and Economic
Behavior.
Cartwright, W.S. Friedland, R.B. (1985) "ThePresident'sCommission on Pension
Policy Household Survey 1979" Review of Income and Wealth 31, 285-308.
Chirikos, T.N. Nestel, C. (1981) "Impairment and Labor Market Outcomes: A Cross-
Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis" in Fames, H. (ed.) Work and Retirement,
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Congressional Quarterly Inc. (1983) Social Security and Retirement Congressional
Quarterly, Washington.
Crawford, V.P., Lilien, D.M. (1981) "Social Security and the Retirement
Decision" Quarterly Journal of Economics August, 505-529.
Danziger, S., Haveman, R. Plotnick, R. (1981) "How Income Transfers Affect Work,
Saving, and the Income Distribution" Journal of Economic Literature 19-3, 975-
1028.
Danziger, S. van der Gaag, J. Smolensky, E. Taussig, N. (1982) "The Life-Cycle
Hypothesis and the Consumption Behavior of the Elderly" Journal of Post-
Keynesian Economics 5, 208-227.
Darby, M.R. (1979) The Effects of Social Security on Income and the Capital
Stock American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
Davies, J.B. (1981) "Uncertain Lifetime, Consumption, and Dissaving in
Retirement" Journal of Political Economy 89-3, 561-577.
Deaton, A. (1986) "Life-Cycle Models of Consumption: Is the Evidence Consistent
with the Theory?" NBER Working Paper 1910.
Diamond, P. (1977) "A Framework for Social Security Analysis" Journal of Public
Economics 8-3, 275-298.
Diamond, P. Hausman, J. (1984a) "Individual Retirement and Savings Behavior"
Journal of Public Economics 23, 81-114.Diamond, P.A., Hausman, J.A. (1984b) "The Retirement and Unemployment Behavior
of Older Men" in Burtless, Aaron (eds) Retirement and Economic Behavior.
Diamond, P. Mirrlees, J.A. (1978) "A Model of Soc:ial Insurance with Variable
Retirement" Journal of Public Economics 10, 295-336.
Dubin, J. McFadden, D. (1984) "An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric
Appliance Holdings and Consumption" Econometrica 52-2, 345-362.
Duff, I.S. (1984) "The Solution of Sparse Linear Equations on the Cray-I" in
J.S. Kowalik (ed) High Speed Computation Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Feldstein, M. (1974) "Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital
Accumulation" Journal of Political Economy 82, 905-926.
Feldstein, M. (1983) "Social Security Benefits and the Accumulation of Pre-
retirement Wealth" in F. Modigliani and R. Hemming (eds.) The Determinants of
National Wealth and Saving St. Martin's Press, New York 3-23.
Feistein, N. Pellechio, A.J. (1979) "Social Security and Household Wealth
Accumulation: New Microeconometric Evidence" Review of Economics and Statistics
61-3, 361-368.
Feldstein, N,S. Pellechio, A. (1979) "Social Security and Household Wealth
Accumulation: New Microeconomic Evidence" Review of Economics and Statistics 61,
361-368.
Fields, G.S. Mitchell, O..S. (1985) Retirement, Pensions, and Social Security
M.I.T. Press.
Fuchs, V.R. (1982) "Time Preference and Health: An Exploratory Study" in V.
Fuchs (ed.) Economic Aspects of Health University of Chicago Press.
Gordon, RH. 'Blinder, A.S. (1980) "Market Wages, Reservation Wages, and
Retirement Decisions" Journal of Public Economics 14, 277-308.
Gotz, G.A. McCall, J.J. (1984) "A Dynamic Retention Model for Air Force
Officers" Research report R-3028-AF, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
California.
Gustman, AL. Steinmeier, T.L. (1983) "Minimum Hours Constraints and Retirement
Behavior" Economic Inquiry 3, 77-91.
Gustman, A.L. Steinmeier, T.L. (1984) "Partial Retirement and the Analysis of
Retirement Behavior" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37, 403-415.
Gustman, A. Steinmeier, T.L. (1986) "A Structural Retirement Model" Econometrica
54-3, 555-584.
Hall, A. Johnson, T. (1980) "The Determinants of Planned Retirement Age"
Industirl and Labor Relations Review 33-2, 241-255.
Hamermesh, D. (1984) "Consumption During Retirement: The Missing Link in the
Life Cycle" Review of Economics and Statistics 66, 1-7.Haneman, W.M. (1984) "Discrete/Continuous Models of Consumer Demand"
Econornetrica 52-3, 541-562.
Hansen, L.P. Singleton, K. (1982) "Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation
of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models" Econometrica 50-5, 1269-1286.
Harris, L. (1984) Retirement nd Income Garland Publishing, New York.
Hurd, M.D. (1986) "Savings and Bequests" NBER Working Paper Series 1826.
Irelan,L. Motley, D. Schwab,K. Sherman, S. Murray, J. (1976) Almost 65: Baseline
Data for the Retirement Ristory Study HEW Research Report 49.
King, H. (1985) "The Economics of Saving: A Survey of Recent Contributions" in
K. Arrow and S. Harkapohja (eds,) Frontiers of Economics Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
King, H. Dicks-Mireaux, L.D. (1982) "Asset Holdings and the Life-Cycle" The
Economic Journal 92, 247-267.
Kotilkoff, L.J. (1979) "Testing the Theory of Social Security and Life Cycle
Accumulation" American Economic Review 69, 396-410.
Kotlikoff, L.J. (1986) "Health Expenditures and Precautionary Savings" NBER
Working Paper Series 2008.
Kotlikoff, L.J. Smith, D.E. (1983) Pensions in the American Economy University
of Chicago Press.
Kotlikoff, L.J. Summers, L.H. (1981) "The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in
Aggregate Capital Accumulation" Journal of Political Economy 89, 706-732.
Kotlikoff, L.J. Spivak,A. Summers, L.H, (1982) "The Adequacy of Savings"
American Economic Review 72-5, 1056-1069.
Kurz, H. (1981) "The Life-cycle Hypothesis and the Effects of Social Security
and Private Pensions on Family Savings" INSSS Technical Report 335, Stanford
University.
Kurz, H. (1985) "Hetrogeneity and Savings Behavior: A Comment" in K. Arrow and
S. }iarkapohja (eds.) Frontiers of Economics Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Kurz, H. (1984) "Capital Accumulation and the Characteristics of Private
Intergenerational Transfers" Economica 51, 1-22.
Liddiard, L.D. (1986) "How to get the most out of a Cray-2" manuscript,
University of Minnesota.
Lucas, R.E. (1976) "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique" in Brunner, K.
Meltzer,A.K. (eds) The Philips Curve end Labor Markets Carnegie-Rochester
ConferenceonPublic Policy 1, North Holland.
MaCurdy, T.E. (1983) "A Simple Scheme for Estimating an Intertemporal Model of
.itallLabor Supply and Consumption in the Presence of Taxes and Unccrtainty"
InterrjatiOt?83 Economic Review 24-2, 265-289.
Marschek, J. (1953) "Economic Measurements for Policy and Prediction" in Hood,
W.C., Koopmans, T.C. (eds) Studies in Econometric Method Wiley.
McFadden, D. (1987) "A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Multinomial
Probits without Numerical Integration" Econometrica, forthcoming.
Menchik, PL. David, H. (1983) "Income Distribution, Lifetime Savings, and
Bequests" American Economic Review 73-4, 672-690.
Menchik, P.L. David, H. (1985) "The Effect of Social Security on Lifetime Wealth
Accumulation and Bequests" Economica 52-208, 421-434.
Miller, R. (1984) "Job Matching and Occupational Choice" Journal of Political
Economy 92-6, 1086-1120.
Hirer, T.W. (1979) "The Wealth-Age Relation among the Agd" An7erican Economic
Review 69-3, 435-443.
Hirer, T. (1980) "The Dissaving Behavior of the Aged" Southrn Economic Journal
46, 1197-1205.
Mitchell, OS., Fields G.S. (1984) "The Economics of Retirement Behavior"
Journal of Labor Economics 2-1, 84-105.
Modigliani, F. (1975) "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving Twenty Years Later"
in H. Pakin (ed.) Contemporary Issues in Economics Manchester University Press.
Modigliani, F. Brumberg, F. (1954) "Utility Analysis and the Consumption
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data" in K. Kurihara (ed.) Post-
Keynesian Economics New Brunswick.
Morrison, H.H. (1982) Economics of Aging: The Future of Retirement van Nostrand
Rheinhold, New York.
Hott, F.L. Haurin, R.J. (1981) "The Impact of Health Problems and Mortality on
Family Well-Being" in Parnes, H. (ed.) Work arid Retirement, MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Hunnell, A,H. (1977) The Future of Social Security Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C.
Pakes, A. (1986) "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding
European Patent Stocks" Econometrica 54-4, 755-784.
Pakes, A. Pollard, D. (1986) "The Asymptotics of Simulation Estimators"
manuscript, University of Wisconsin.
Parnes, H.S. (editor) (1981) Work and Retirement MIT Press, Cambridge.
Parnes, H.S. (editor) (1983) Policy Issues in Work nd Retirement W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan.Parsons, DO. (1982) "The Male Labour Force Participation Decision: Health,
Reported Health, and Economic Incentives" Economics 49, 81-91.
Pellechio, A.J. (1979) "Social Security Financing and Retirement Behavior"
American Economic Review 69-2, 284-287.
Quinn, J. F. (1977) "Microeconomic Determinants of Early Retirement: A Cross-
Sectional View of White Married Men" Journal of Human Resources 12, 329-346.
Quinn, J.F. Burkhauser, R.V. (1983) "Is Mandatory Retirement Overrated?:
Evidence from the 1970's" Journal of Human Resources 18-3, 337-358.
Rust, J. (1986) "Maximiurn Likelihood Estimation of Discrete Control Processes"
SSRI Working Paper 8407.
Rust, J. (1987) "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of
Harold Zurcher" Econometrica, forthcoming.
Rust, J. (1987a) "An Inverse Solution Algorithm for Structural Estimation of
Discrete Control Processes"
Sargent, T.J. (1981) "Interpreting Economic Time Series" Journal of PolItical
Economy 89-2, 213-248.
Schulz, J.H.(1976) The Economics of Aging Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont,
California.
Sickles, R.C. Taubman, P. (1986) "An Analysis of the Health and Retirement
Status of the Elderly" Econometrics 54-6, 1339-1356.
Sheshinski, E. (1978) "A Model of Social Security and Retirement Decisions"
Journal of Public Economics 10, 337-360.
Stein, B. (1980) Social Security and Prensioris in Transition Free Press,
Macmillan Publishing Co., New York.
Sueyoshi, G. (1986) "Social Security and the Determinants of Full and Partial
Retirement: A Competing Risks Analysis" manuscript, M.I.T.
Thompson, L.H. (1981) "The Social Security Reform Debate" Journal of Economic
Literature 21-4, 1425-1467.
Tobin, J. (1967) "Life-Cycle Saving and Balanced Growth" in W. Feliner (ed.) Ten
Economic Studies in the Tradition of Irving Fisher New-York, 231-256.
White, B. (1978) "Empirical Tests of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis" American
Economic Review 68, 547-560.
White, B. (1984) "Empirical Tests of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis: Reply" American
Economic Review 74, 258-259.
Williams, C.A.jr. Turnbull, J.G. Cheit, E.F. (1982) Economic and Social
Security: Social Insurance nd Other Approaches Wiley, New York.Wise, D. (ed.) (1985) Pensions, Labor and Individual Choice University of
Chicago Press.
Wolpin, K. (1984) "An Estimable Dynamic Stochastic Model of Fertility and Child
Mortality" Journal of Political Economy 92-5, 852-874.
Yaari, ME.(1965)"Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the
Consumer" Reviefr of Economic Studies 32, 137-150.
Levhari, D. Mirman, L.J. (1977) "Savings and Consumption with an Uncertain
Horizon" Journal of Political Economy 85-2, 265-281.
Zabaiza, A., Pissarides, C., Barton, H. (1980) "Social Security and the Choice
Between Full-time Work, Part-time Work, and Retirement" Journal of Public
Economics 14, 245-276.